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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of asset prices in comparison to other factors, in particu-
lar exchange rates, as a driver of the US trade balance. It employs a Bayesian structural
VAR model that requires imposing only a minimum of economically meaningful sign
restrictions. We nd that equity market shocks and housing price shocks have been
major determinants of the US current account in the past, accounting for up to 30%
of the movements of the US trade balance at a horizon of 20 quarters. By contrast,
shocks to the real exchange rate have been less relevant, explaining about 9% and ex-
erting a more temporary e¤ect on the US trade balance. Our ndings suggest that large
exchange rate movements may not necessarily be the key element of an adjustment of
todays large current account imbalances, and that in particular relative global asset
price changes could be a potent source of adjustment.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of large global current account imbalances over the past decade has triggered a
controversial academic as well as policy debate about their causes and likely adjustment. The
controversy stems in part from the two-sided nature of these imbalances, reected in a large current
account decit in the US  reaching close to 7% of US GDP in 2006 before improving to about
5% of US GDP in 2008. One camp of this debate points at the US as a driver of the imbalances,
and in particular at its low private and public savings (e.g. Krugman, 2006). Yet the large US
external decit may not solely reect policy distortions but is at least partly due to the rise in
US productivity (e.g. Corsetti et al., 2006; Bems et al., 2007; Bussiere et al., 2005), expectations
of a rising share of the US in world output (Engel and Rogers, 2006), and a reduction in income
volatility and uncertainty (Fogli and Perri, 2006). Another camp focuses on the role of surplus
countries and points at the saving glut in Asia and oil-exporting countries (e.g. Bernanke, 2005).
In particular, Caballero et al. (2006) and Ju and Wei (2006) argue that the lack of nancial assets
and incompleteness of asset markets in emerging market economies (EMEs) is key for understanding
the direction of capital ows from poor to rich countries and its composition, the ample liquidity
in global capital markets and low interest rates.1
A related strand of the literature concentrates on likely adjustment mechanisms. Some theoret-
ical work argues that required exchange rate changes, in particular a depreciation of the US dollar,
to reduce trade imbalances may potentially be large (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2005; Blanchard et
al., 2005), while others point out that such implications are not necessarily borne out by all models
and that, under some scenarios, required exchange rate changes may be smaller (Engel and Rogers,
2006; Cavallo and Tille, 2006).
An important question is the role of asset prices as a driver of global current account positions.
One striking feature of the global economy over the past 15 years has been the pronounced cycles
and booms in asset prices.2 This rise in asset prices has been more pronounced in the US than in
1Related studies point at the rapidly increasing degree of global nancial integration and ensuing valuation e¤ects
on gross international asset positions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005; Gourinchas and Rey, 2007), while others
underline the role of precautionary motives due to uncertainty and demographics as a rationale for the high saving
rates in several EMEs (e.g. Gruber and Kamin, 2007; Chinn and Ito, 2007). Taking a di¤erent perspective, Lane and
Perotti (1998) nd that scal policy, in conjunction with exchange rate adjustment, is important for the behavior of
the trade balance, while Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) stress the role of trade openness and reserves in this regard.
2We distinguish the exchange rate from other asset prices throughout the paper in order to stress that it a¤ects
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other advanced economies and many EMEs. However, following the subprime crisis that began in
the summer of 2007, asset prices have experienced sharp declines in the US and, to a lesser extent,
in other major economies. These developments in global and relative asset prices are likely to have
impacted signicantly global current account positions. Empirically, such a connection has not
been formally investigated, and we know little about the potential for asset prices to induce current
account movements.3 In principle, asset prices are relevant for current account determination and
adjustment through wealth e¤ects. The underlying logic is that a rise in asset prices (in particular
if it is expected to be permanent) increases expected income of households and thus consumption,
while also making it easier for rms to nance investment opportunities, inducing a deterioration
in a countrys trade balance.4
The objective of the present paper is to quantify the importance of asset prices versus exchange
rate shocks for the current account, and to identify the channels through which they operate from
the perspective of the US. We focus our analysis on the exogenous component of exchange rates
and asset prices, rather than their endogenous component, because it is well documented that
only a relatively small part of the uctuations in these variables can be explained empirically
by economic fundamentals. Our empirical methodology is based on a Bayesian structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) model, stemming from the work of Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig
(2009). This approach requires imposing only a small number of sign restrictions that have an
economically meaningful interpretation, while avoiding some of the identication problems present
in more traditional structural VAR models. We choose identifying restrictions on the basis of
existing empirical literature rather than a structural model, partly because theoretical models of
the current account have been shown to be invalid empirically and partly because structural models
with a broad set of asset prices are hard to formalize.5 Importantly, our methodology using sign
the current account through fundamentally di¤erent channels than, for example, equity prices.
3Studies that analyze the theoretical connection of asset prices and current account developments include Ventura
(2001), Caballero et al. (2006) and Kraay and Ventura (2005).
4Various segments of the academic literature analyze individual elements that are relevant for understanding the
channels of this link. One strand investigates the e¤ects of changes in wealth on consumption, nding marginal
propensities to consume of between 0.06 and 0.12 with respect to changes in housing wealth, and somewhat smaller
e¤ects with regard to other forms of wealth (Betraut, 2002; Case et al., 2005; Palumbo et al., 2002). A di¤erent
literature has looked at the sensitivity of imports to changes in domestic demand, showing that there is a unit elasticity
in the long-run (e.g. Clarida, 1994), though recent work emphasizes important di¤erences in these elasticities between
changes in investment and changes in consumption (Erceg et al., 2006).
5Tests of the intertemporal model of the current account, which postulates that a countrys current account
position should be equal to the present discounted value of future changes in net output, are frequently based on
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restrictions on the impulse responses of di¤erent types of shocks allows us to distinguish the e¤ects
of asset prices from those of other factors. The results are robust to a battery of VAR specications
that include not only variables commonly used in an open-economy setting  such as the real
exchange rate, the trade balance, relative consumption, relative prices and relative interest rates
(see Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995)  but also asset prices.
The empirical ndings indicate that equity market shocks and housing price shocks have been
important determinants of US current account developments in the past. In the variance decompo-
sition, the two shocks account for up to 30% of the movements of the US trade balance at a horizon
of 20 quarters. By contrast, shocks to the real exchange rate explain about 9% and have exerted
a more temporary e¤ect on the US trade balance. The impulse responses show that a 10% rise in
US equity prices relative to the rest of the world lowers the US trade balance by around 0.85% of
US GDP, while housing price shocks exhibit a slightly larger elasticity. The e¤ects of both asset
price shocks build up gradually over time, with the impulse responses reaching their peaks after
around 3 years. On impact, a real exchange rate depreciation induces a slight worsening of the
trade balance, consistent with a J-curve e¤ect and a standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model,
before improving gradually and becoming positive in its e¤ect on the trade balance. However, real
exchange rate shocks exhibit less persistent e¤ects than asset price shocks.
What do these empirical ndings imply, and how do they t into the ndings and theories of
the existing literature? We stress that we do not interpret the e¤ects of asset price shocks that we
nd here necessarily as an alternative, but rather as an explanation that is complementary to those
of the literature outlined above. For instance, our empirical ndings suggest that also productivity,
monetary and scal policy shocks have been highly relevant in the past. However, the importance
of asset prices is robust to the inclusion of additional shocks, underlining that they have indeed
been a major determinant of current account movements.
The ndings of the present paper are linked to several contributions in the literature on current
account dynamics. In particular, the focus on asset prices in the present paper is linked to the work
the procedure developed by Campbell (1987) to test for the restrictions implied by a present value model of asset
prices in a VAR framework. However, She¤rin and Woo (1990) nd that the simple intertemporal model of the
current account cannot be rejected only for Belgium and Denmark but is invalid for other countries. Bergin and
She¤rin (2000) augment the present-value model to allow for stochastic interest rates and exchange rates, but also
the evidence using such models is rather weak, with several papers suggesting a rejection of the model (Nason and
Rogers, 2006).
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on news shocks by Beaudry and Portier (2006), in which expectations about future productivity
a¤ect current equity prices. As to the work on current account dynamics, Blanchard et al. (2005)
and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005) show that a reversal of the US current account decit is likely to
be associated with a large depreciation of the e¤ective US dollar exchange rate, possibly in excess
of 50 to 60 percent. Our paper di¤ers from this strand of the literature at a methodological level,
since we use a structural VAR to examine the drivers of the uctuations in the US current account
and their relative contribution to current account adjustment. In this sense, the contribution of
our paper is distinctively empirical, and lies in the estimation of the relative importance of di¤erent
sources of shocks for current account determination. While conrming the standard result that a
currency depreciation is associated with part of the adjustment process in the current account, our
results also suggest that a massive exchange rate adjustment of the kind suggested by the above
literature may not be necessary for current account imbalances to adjust. In fact, movements in
asset (equity and housing) prices have been a key driver of the US trade balance in the past; thus
relative asset price changes in the future  either through a drop in US asset prices, a (stronger)
rise in foreign asset prices, or both  may be a potent channel for a future adjustment.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical methodol-
ogy based on a structural, Bayesian VAR framework in the context of the sign restrictions approach.
Section 2 also discusses our identication assumptions. Section 3 describes the data. The bench-
mark results are presented in Section 4, while we report a battery of robustness tests in Section 5.
Section 6 summarizes the results, outlines some policy implications and concludes.
2 The Bayesian VAR Model and Identication
We are interested in analyzing the impact of an exchange rate shock, an equity market shock and a
housing price shock on the trade balance of the US in the framework of a VAR model. We follow the
approach based on sign restrictions proposed by Uhlig (2005). In addition, since we are interested
in accounting for the international transmission mechanism, we consider a VAR model in an open
6Also, recall that the focus in much of this literature is on the endogenous response of the current account and the
exchange rate to exogenous shocks in the economy. Because exchange rates (and asset prices) are generally di¢cult
to explain in terms of conventional economic fundamentals and the bulk of their uctuations is hardly attributable
to structural forces, we focus in this paper on the exogenous shocks to exchange rates and asset prices rather than
their endogenous component.
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economy framework. We achieve this by incorporating US variables measured with respect to the
rest of the world, proxied by the other G7 countries. This is an appealing feature given that our
main variable of interest, the trade balance, is measured with respect to the rest of the world.7
2.1 VAR model
Consider the reduced form VAR
Yt = B(L)Yt 1 + ut; (1)
where Yt is an n  1 vector of time series; B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; ut
is an n  1 vector of residuals, with variance-covariance matrix E[utut
0] = ; and t = 1; : : : ; T .
In practice, we also allow for an intercept term in the VAR, which is omitted in equation (1) for
simplicity.
Identication of the VAR in equation (1) is based on imposing enough restrictions to decompose
ut and obtain economically meaningful structural innovations. Let et be an n1 vector of structural
innovations, assumed to be independent, so that E[ete
0
t] = In. We need to nd a matrix A such
that Aet = ut. The j-th column of A, aj , is the impulse vector and depicts the contemporaneous
impact of the j-th structural shock of one standard deviation in size on the n endogenous variables
in the system. The only restriction on A so far is
 = E[utu
0
t] = AE[ete
0
t]A
0 = AA0: (2)
We need at least n(n 1)=2 restrictions on A to achieve identication. A conventional method
is to orthogonalize the reduced form disturbances by the Cholesky decomposition. This method
assumes a recursive structure on A so that A is restricted to be lower triangular.
2.2 Sign restriction approach
Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) achieve identication of the above VAR model
imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a set of variables. Uhlig (2005, Prop. A.1)
shows that any impulse vector a 2 Rn can be recovered if there is an n-dimensional vector q of unit
length such that a = eAq, where eA eA0 = , and eA is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of .
7 Ideally one would want to specify the benchmark model with US variables relative to those of a broader proxy
for the rest of the world, e.g. including large emerging markets such as China. Data limitations for such countries
do not allow a full specication for all relevant variables.
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Let us start from the case where we wish to identify one structural shock, as in our benchmark
VAR results in Section 5.1 below. After estimating the coe¢cients of theB(L)matrix using ordinary
least squares (OLS), the impulse responses of n variables up to S horizons can be calculated for a
given structural impulse vector aj as follows
rs = [I  B(L)]
 1 aj ; (3)
where rs is the matrix of impulse responses at horizon s. Sign restrictions can be imposed on a
subset of the n variables over the horizon 0; :::; S so that the impulse vector aj identies the shock
of interest. The estimation of the impulse responses is obtained by simulation. Given the estimated
reduced form VAR, we draw q vectors from a uniform distribution in Rn, divide it by its length,
obtain a candidate draw for aj and calculate its impulse responses, while discarding any q where
the sign restrictions are violated.
More precisely, as shown in Uhlig (2005), the estimation and inference is carried out as follows.
A prior is formed for the reduced-form VAR. In this case, using as a prior a Normal-Wishart
in (B(L);) implies that the posterior is the Normal-Wishart for (B(L);) times the indicator
function on eAq.8 To draw from this posterior we take a joint draw from the posterior of the
Normal-Wishart for (B(L);) as well as a draw from the unit sphere to obtain candidate q vectors.
The draw from the posterior is used to calculate the Cholesky decomposition as in equation (2).9
Using each q draw, we compute the associated aj vectors and calculate the impulse responses as
described in equation (3). If all the impulse responses satisfy the sign restrictions, the joint draw
on (B(L); ; a) is kept. Each q draw for which the sign restrictions are not satised is discarded.
This procedure is repeated until we obtain 1000 draws that satisfy the restrictions, and error bands
are calculated based on the draws kept.
Let us now turn to the more general case where we wish to identify multiple shocks, say m. In
our empirical work, we identify up to three structural shocks, so that m = 3. In this case, we can
characterize an impulse matrix

a(1); a(2); a(3)

of rank 3. This can be accomplished by imposing
8Essentially the indicator function discriminates the draws where the sign restrictions are satised and where they
are not. Also, Uhlig (2005) points out that di¤erent priors might a¤ect the VAR results. This experiment is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper.
9Note that this identication scheme does not use the Cholesky decomposition for the purpose of identifying shocks
but only as a useful computational tool. Any other factorization would deliver the same results (for a formal proof,
see Mountford and Uhlig, 2009).
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economically motivated sign restrictions on the impulse responses in addition to restrictions that
ensure orthogonality of these structural shocks, since by construction the covariance between the
structural shocks e
(1)
t ; e
(2)
t and e
(3)
t corresponding to a
(1); a(2) and a(3) is zero.
To see this, start from noting that

a(1); :::; a(m)

= eAQ, with themnmatrixQ = q(1); : : : ; q(m)
of orthonormal rows q(j), i.e. QQ0 = Im. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) show that the impulse re-
sponses for the impulse vector a can be written as a linear combination of the impulse responses
to the Cholesky decomposition of  in the following way. Dene rjis as the impulse response
of the j-th variable at horizon s to the i-th column of eA, and the n-dimensional column vector
ris = [r1i; : : : ; rni]. The n-dimensional impulse response ras at horizon s to the impulse vector a
(s)
is given by
ras = 
n
i=1qiris (4)
where qi is the i-th entry of q = q
(s).
To identify an impulse matrix

a(1); a(2); a(3)

, identify a(1), a(2) and a(3) using the relevant sign
restrictions a(1) = eAq(1), a(2) = eAq(2) and a(3) = eAq(3), and jointly impose orthogonality conditions
in the form q0q(1) = 0 and q0q(2) = 0. In practice, we take a joint draw from the posterior of
the Normal-Wishart for (B(L);) and obtain candidate q vectors. If all of the impulse responses
satisfy the above restrictions, the joint draw is kept. Each q draw for which the sign restrictions
are not satised is discarded. This procedure is repeated until 1000 draws are obtained that satisfy
the restrictions; error bands are calculated based on the draws that are kept.
From a methodological perspective, the sign restriction approach has several advantages. In
particular, the results are independent of the chosen decomposition of . This means that a di¤erent
ordering of the variables does not alter the results. In addition, this method involves simultaneous
estimation of the reduced-from VAR and the impulse vector. The idea is that the draws of the
VAR parameters from the unrestricted posterior that do not satisfy the sign restrictions receive a
zero prior weight.
2.3 Related methods
Other seminal contributions on the sign restriction approach include - inter alia - Faust (1998),
Canova and Pina (1999), and Canova and De Nicoló (2002, 2003). Faust (1998) imposes sign
restrictions only on impact. In contrast, Canova and Pina (1999) and Canova and De Nicoló (2002,
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2003) impose sign restrictions on the cross-correlation function of impulse responses of the VAR
variables. Uhligs (2005) approach di¤ers from Faust (1998) in that restrictions are imposed for
several periods. In comparison to Canova and De Nicoló (2002, 2003), the identication in Uhlig
(2005) is based on impulse responses and not on cross-correlations.
It is important to note that the implementation of the sign restrictions approach in Uhlig (2005)
and in this paper has some shortcomings due to the key role of the median response used to examine
the dynamics of the VAR model. Median responses for di¤erent shocks and horizons may combine
information from several identication schemes. This implies that the required orthogonality con-
dition of the shocks may not be satised when using the median response, potentially invalidating
the variance decomposition. Fry and Pagan (2007) proposed an alternative method to overcome
this problem, by choosing a response as close as possible to the median while imposing that the
responses are generated from one single identifying matrix Q. We adopt the Fry-Pagan approach
in the robustness analysis later in the paper.
2.4 The empirical model
Using quarterly data over the sample period 1974Q1-2008Q2, we consider the VAR model for
Yt =

c  c p  p i  i reer eq   eq h  h TB
0
; (5)
where an asterisk refers to a variable calculated for the G7 countries without the US (G7 ex US ).
We dene c  c as the di¤erence of the log private consumption of the US and G7 ex US ; p  p is
the di¤erence between the log price level in the US and G7 ex US ; i  i is the di¤erence between
the short-term interest rate in the US and the short-term interest rate in G7 ex US ; reer is the
log of the real e¤ective exchange rate (expressed as the foreign price of the domestic currency);
eq   eq is the di¤erence between the log of equity prices in the US and the log of equity prices
in G7 ex US ; h  h is the di¤erence between the log of nominal US housing prices and the log of
nominal housing prices in G7 ex US ; and tb is the US trade balance divided by GDP. A detailed
description of these variables (and the weights used) is provided in the next section. Note that we
use consumption, rather than GDP, as we are interested in the transmission channels, especially
wealth e¤ects, of shocks to asset prices and exchange rates.
Our modelling strategy involves starting from a simple 5-variable VAR (benchmark VAR)
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that includes the exchange rate but initially excludes equity and housing prices. We then examine
larger VARs where the two asset price variables are added to the model specication (augmented
VAR). We use 3 lags for each VAR, based on the Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SIC) information
criteria. Moreover, we set the time horizon for which the restrictions hold after a shock to S = 2
quarters for the baseline model.10
The crucial issue is the identication of the three shocks of interest, i.e. the exchange rate
shock and the shocks to equity prices and housing prices. We focus our analysis on the exogenous
component of exchange rates and asset prices, rather than their endogenous component, because
it is well documented that only a relatively small part of the uctuations in these variables can be
explained empirically by economic fundamentals. Put another way, a large part of the variation
in exchange rates and asset prices is driven by their own shocks, which cannot be easily linked to
the state of the economy. For example, Artis and Ehrmann (2006) show that the exchange rate is
largely driven by its own shocks for several major economies in the context of a structural VAR,
while the vast literature on explaining movements in equity prices indicates that economically
meaningful variables do not explain more than 10-15% of the variation in equity returns (e.g.
Cochrane, 2005, and the references therein). Moreover, large and persistent bubbles (deviations
from fundamentals) in house prices have long characterized the real estate markets of the US, the
UK and other major economies (e.g. Case and Shiller, 1989; Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997).
It is worth noting, however, that in theory current account adjustment could simply occur
through an endogenous response of, say, the real exchange rate. To give an example, even if
there are no exogenous shocks to the real exchange rate at all (where shocks are conceptualized as
sudden changes in portfolio preferences or nonfundamental uctuations, related to noise trading or
bubbles), endogenous exchange rate changes may still play an important role in current account
adjustment. Such endogenous changes might reect, for instance, a currency risk premium that is
negatively related to the size of the current account balance; in the context of equation (1), this
endogenous dynamics would be captured by B(L) instead of u. In empirical work, the explanatory
power in equations for asset prices is generally miniscule, implying that the systematic response
10The SIC generally suggests 1 or 2 lags, whereas the AIC usually selects 2 to 3 lags. We decided to estimate all
VAR models with 3 lags to ensure that the residuals are well behaved. Qualitatively, however, the impulse responses
calculated when using 2 lags or 4 lags are identical to the ones generated from the VAR with 3 lags. In addition, we
also experimented for slightly di¤erent values of S, obtaining very similar results.
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of asset prices and exchange rates does not, in the absence of shocks, exhibit strong stabilizing
properties. Therefore, to reiterate, our focus on exogenous shocks rather than the endogenous
response to disequilibria is rationalized purely on the basis of these stylized empirical facts.
There are two conceptual challenges in identifying shocks to exchange rates and asset prices.
First, the sign restrictions imposed to identify these shocks should be economically meaningful. To
this end, we impose sign restrictions that have received support in previous empirical work. Second,
the sign restrictions must uniquely identify these three shocks, and not other types of shocks that are
included or excluded in our model specication. Table 1 summarizes the short-run sign restrictions
imposed. The restrictions imposed to identify an appreciation of the real e¤ective exchange rate
are that the real e¤ective exchange rate increases (i.e. appreciates), the short-term interest rate
di¤erential between the US and the other G7 countries decreases, the price di¤erential between
the US and the other G7 countries decreases, and relative domestic consumption increases. The
rationale for these restrictions stems from the perspective of a monetary policy reaction function:
an appreciation should reduce import prices and domestic ination, thus requiring a decrease in
domestic short-term interest rates and thereby stimulating consumption.
Table 1. Identication of shocks through sign restrictions
Shock: c  c p  p i  i reer eq   eq h  h TB
Appreciation +     +
Equity + + +
Housing + + + +
To identify a positive equity market shock, we impose that relative equity prices, the interest
rate di¤erential, and relative consumption all increase. The rst of these restrictions is obvious;
the second is perhaps less clear-cut and is largely inspired by compelling evidence in the literature.
For instance, Rigobon and Sack (2003)  using an identication method based on the underlying
heteroskedasticity of the data  show that short-term interest rates rise signicantly in response to
higher equity prices. Moreover, domestic consumption should rise in response to a positive equity
shock, reecting a canonical wealth channel (e.g. Di Giorgio and Nisticó, 2007).
Similarly, a positive relative housing price shock is identied by restricting the relative housing
price index, the price di¤erential, relative consumption and relative interest rates not to decrease.
These restrictions are consistent with the impulse responses and the theoretical model of Iacoviello
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(2005), which shows that shocks to house prices induce an increase in interest rates and ination.
However, Iacoviellos (2005) theory does imply that a positive house price shock can induce either
an increase or a decrease in consumption depending on the parameter values of the calibration,
although empirically he nds that consumption responds positively to house price shocks, consistent
with our identifying assumption and with the basic intuition of wealth e¤ects.11
It is important to note that, from a theoretical point of view, rising house prices have quite
di¤erent e¤ects than rising equity prices. The main reason is that housing does not represent just
an asset, but also a signicant share of households future expenditure burdens. Thus, while there
are agents who benet from rising house prices (if they have overinvested in housing relative to
their longer-term demand for housing services) there are also those in the opposite camp. This
precludes uncontroversial predictions about the sign of the income or wealth e¤ect, although there
are likely to be positive e¤ects on aggregate consumption through the impact of housing wealth on
household collateral and, hence, liquidity constraints.
The impulse responses for variables on which sign restrictions are not imposed are unrestricted;
these are the blank cells in Table 1. In particular, the response of the trade balance is unrestricted,
which is the main focus of our analysis. Since equity and housing shocks are asset prices shocks, the
signs of the responses of relative consumption and relative interest rates are the same. However,
the sign of the response of equity prices after a housing shock is uncertain and viceversa, and the
responses of the VAR variables could be the same for equity and housing shocks. In order to uniquely
identify the two asset prices shocks in the cases when all of the responses to these two shocks have
the same sign, we identify the equity shock as the shock with the largest contemporaneous impact
on relative equity prices. The latter seems a straightforward and uncontroversial assumption to
disentangle the two shocks, and follows the approach used by Peersman (2005) in the context of
identifying supply and oil shocks.
It is well known that identication of shocks is a very di¢cult task in the structural VAR
literature. We impose a small number of sign restrictions and avoid imposing zero restrictions,
which would be di¢cult to rationalize in our context on the basis of conventional theories of the
current account. However, a specic concern for this paper is that the shocks we identify may at
11Note also that Iacoviello (2005) adopts a closed-economy model, and hence the endogenous variables are not
dened with respect to another country. However, the basic results of the analysis are unaltered when generalizing
to an open-economy setting (e.g. Punzi, 2006).
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least partly reect other shocks; for instance an increase in equity prices may be due to a positive
productivity shock. We argue that other shocks di¤er fundamentally from equity shocks. In the
case of a productivity shock, equity prices may also increase, but contrary to equity price shocks,
a productivity shock should lower domestic prices and domestic interest rates, rather than raise
them. We will return to a detailed robustness analysis in Section 5, where we address these issues
by allowing for additional shocks into the model.
3 Data
We use quarterly data over the period 1974Q1-2008Q2. The rest of the world series are identied
by an asterisk in our notation and are calculated as weighted averages of G7 ex US, except for
consumption, which is dened as the sum of consumption in G7 ex US.
Figure 1 (Panel A) shows the time series of the log of consumption in the US (c) and G7 ex US
(c). The data on real consumption are seasonally adjusted in local currencies at 2000 price levels,
and taken from the OECD. We convert the consumption series to US dollars using the average
market exchange rate of 2000.12 c is the log of the sum of consumption in G7 ex US. Prices and
interest rates are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), while the real e¤ective exchange rate is taken from the US Federal Reserve Board
Statistics. The price series are based on the consumer price index (CPI), and are presented in
logs in Figure 1. The short-term interest rates are 3-month money market rates. The evolution
of prices (p and p) and interest rates (i and i) in the US and G7 ex US may be seen in Panels
B and C, respectively, of Figure 1. Prices in the US and G7 ex US move together for the whole
period. Interest rates reveal a clear downward trend since the beginning of the 1980s. However,
interest rates in the US since the 1990s have generally been lower than in the other G7 countries.
The largest di¤erential of around 700 basis points occurred in 1993 around the time of the crisis of
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in Europe. Panel D of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the
real e¤ective exchange rate (REER). The US dollar experienced a strong real appreciation from
the early to mid 1980s, then depreciated until 1995 before appreciating again till the early 2000s;
it then depreciated steadily until recent times. Note that the REER in our VAR specication is
12We do this to preserve consistency with the prices base year.
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measured in logs.
The US equity measure, EQ, is the S&P500 price index, sourced from Bloomberg. EQ is
an aggregate of the stock prices in the other G7 countries weighted according to their respective
(time-varying) GDP shares at purchasing power parity (PPP) values.13 Panel E of Figure 1 shows
EQ and EQ. The general trend of EQ and EQ is largely common, reecting the general strong
performance of equity markets around the world during the sample period, with downwards correc-
tions being especially apparent in the early 2000s (the dotcom bubble crash) and since 2007 (the
subprime crisis).
The US housing price index is obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The index for the other G7 countries also stems from the BIS and is calculated using time-varying
GDP shares at PPP weights.14 Panel F of Figure 1 plots the US housing price index (H) and
the corresponding housing price index for G7 ex US (H). While both housing price indices trend
upwards during most of the sample, it is clear that the US housing price index reveals a more
pronounced cycle from the early 2000s until 2007, when the US housing market started declining
in the aftermath of the subprime crisis.
Finally, the US trade balance, TB series was obtained from the IFS (seasonally adjusted) and
is expressed as a ratio of GDP.15 Panel G of Figure 1 shows that since the early 1990s the US has
experienced a steady widening in the trade balance decit, reaching about 6.6% of GDP in 2005
and about 7.0% of GDP in 2006. Since then the trade balance has improved slightly, at the same
time when the US equity market and, to a lesser extent, the housing market started to decline.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Benchmark VAR and augmented VAR
We now turn to the empirical ndings, by presenting the benchmark results from implementing the
Bayesian VAR described in Section 2. We begin from a VAR containing a subset of the variables
in equation (5). Specically, we start from a benchmark VAR specication without asset prices
13Specically, we use the FTSE 100 for the UK, the CAC40 for France, the DAX for Germany, the MIB for Italy,
the S&P/TSX for Canada, and the Nikkei 225 for Japan.
14Due to missing data from 2005 to 2008 for Germany and Italy we updated the database from Hypoport and
ISTAT, respectively.
15The US GDP series is taken from the IFS, and it is expressed as seasonally adjusted.
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and then extend the model gradually to include equity prices and housing prices. This allows us
to understand whether and how the inclusion of asset prices into the model changes the empirical
ndings. The benchmark 5-variable VAR comprises the real exchange rate, trade balance, relative
consumption, relative prices and relative interest rates, i.e. Yt = [c  c
 p  p i  i reer TB]0.16
Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of a real exchange rate shock using the Bayesian VAR approach with
sign restrictions. In all cases, impulse responses are calculated by simulation using the methods
described in Sims and Zha (2006). Following Uhlig (2005), each gure shows the median (solid
line) as well as the 16th and 84th quantiles (dashed lines). In a normal distribution these quantiles
would represent a one standard deviation band. It is common in the VAR literature to report
the 2.3% and 97.7% quantiles, which would represent a two standard deviation band in a normal
distribution. Given that inference is a¤ected by model uncertainty, it is fairly standard in this
Bayesian VAR literature to report the 16th and 84th quantiles (e.g. Uhlig, 2005).
The impulse responses in Figure 2 suggest that a positive shock (an appreciation of the US
dollar) improves the US trade balance slightly upon impact, consistent with a J-curve e¤ect. After
this initial reaction, the trade balance deteriorates from 2 quarters onwards and shows a statistically
signicant negative reaction between 5 and 11 quarters, while the real exchange rate gradually
reverts back to its mean, consistent with some notion of (long-run) PPP. However, the magnitude
of the e¤ect is fairly small: a 1.0% real appreciation of the US dollar worsens the US trade balance
by about 0.1% of US GDP. In the context of the current large decit that characterizes the US
trade balance, these estimates imply that even a relatively high real depreciation of the US dollar,
for instance by 10%, would improve the US trade balance by a modest 1.0%.
Through what channels does the exchange rate inuence the trade balance? The imposition of
our sign restrictions implies that the appreciation shock generates a small decrease in the US interest
rate relative to the average rest-of-the-world interest rate. The interaction between interest rates
and exchange rates resembles the dynamics implied by the forward discount bias routinely recorded
in empirical work on exchange rates (Engel, 1996). To see this, note that the positive real exchange
16One may argue that a general to specic approach to econometric modelling may be preferable and hence we
should start from the most general, augmented VAR. However, conscious of the fact that no VAR model can possibly
avoid omitted variable problems, we prefer to start from a simple VAR and move upwards in terms of model size.
As shown below, the dynamics depicted by the responses to exchange rate shocks in the simplest VAR without asset
prices turn out to be fairly robust when increasing the size of the VAR in subsequent estimations.
15
rate shock induces a downward movement in interest rates, which according to uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP) should imply expectations of a subsequent currency appreciation. However,
the US dollar depreciates after the initial appreciation, consistent with the presence of a forward
discount bias. One interpretation of the interest rate response is that it is in line with a monetary
policy reaction function  in particular as our interest rates are short-term rates, controlled by
the central bank. Hence, domestic interest rates are initially lowered by the monetary authority
after a currency appreciation due to lower inationary pressures, and are then subsequently raised
as price pressures increase. Another interpretation is that the current account adjustment occurs
via expenditure switching e¤ects in response to the exchange rate shock. Although this e¤ect
is not immediately transparent in the VAR model because we do not disaggregate exports and
imports in our measure of the trade balance, the results are indirectly suggesting that the relatively
small response of the current account to exchange rate shocks is consistent with existing empirical
evidence that price elasticities of US export and imports are small (Campa and Goldberg, 2009).
Moreover, while it is worth mentioning expenditure switching e¤ects in thinking about the channels
of inuence from the exchange rate to the trade balance, we prefer the rst interpretation above
since the expenditure-switching channel is likely to be largely endogenous, rather than driven by
exogenous shocks.17
Next, we add relative equity prices and house prices in the VAR, which is now the augmented
7-variable VAR of equation (5). Figures 3.A to 3.C show the impulse response functions for real
exchange rate shocks, relative equity shocks and housing price shocks, respectively. The trade
balance impulse response for the real exchange rate shock (Figure 3.A) in this 7-variable VAR is
similar to the VAR without asset prices. The impulse response to an equity market shock (Figure
3.B) reveals that the e¤ect of an equity price shock on the US trade balance is quantitatively
comparable to and more persistent than a real exchange rate shock. A positive relative equity
shock of about 1.8% (10%) lowers the US trade balance by 0.15% (0.85%) after 10 quarters, which
is comparable to the impact of the real exchange rate shock on the trade balance. This is particularly
important given that relative equity market changes, especially throughout the 1990s, have been
17For example, in the presence of real shocks that are specic to one country (such as productivity shocks, or scal
shocks, etc.), nominal exchange rate changes can induce adjustment of relative prices of goods across countries. A
country that experiences a productivity increase should experience a decline in the price of its output that induces a
switch in expenditures toward the domestic product.
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substantially larger than those for real exchange rates. Moreover, US equity shocks raise relative
real interest rates and relative consumption, and both e¤ects are sizeable and persistent. This set
of impulse response functions is consistent with the functioning of an equity market shock through
wealth e¤ects: a rise in equity prices, in particular if it is expected to be persistent, increases the
expected income of households and thus consumption, as well as investment and output due to
higher demand, thus worsening the trade balance. Interestingly, a relative equity market shock
does not have a signicant e¤ect on the real exchange rate of the US dollar. Finally, a positive
US housing market shock (Figure 3.C) leads to a signicant and persistent deterioration of the
US trade balance, with a 1.0% (10%) rise in US housing prices lowering the US trade balance by
0.16% (1.6%) after 11 quarters. US housing price developments appear to a¤ect the other variables
in the VAR in a similar fashion as US equity market shocks. Also, note that a positive housing
price shock raises relative equity prices somewhat. This is indicative of ensuing wealth e¤ects of
the housing market increase not only to raise consumption but also the demand for equities, thus
exerting an upward pressure on equity prices.
4.2 Variance decomposition
As the nal step of the core empirical analysis, we turn to a variance decomposition and, in
particular, to the question of how much of the variation of the US trade balance over the sample is
accounted for by asset price shocks as compared to real exchange rate developments. The results,
given in Table 2, show a compelling nding: a substantial share of the variations in the US trade
balance is explained by asset price shocks. Indeed, close to 30% of the trade balance is explained
by equity market shocks and housing price shocks at a horizon of 20 quarters. By contrast, at most
9% of the US trade balance is accounted for by shocks to the US dollar real exchange rate at the
20-quarter horizon.
17
Table 2. Variance decomposition for the US trade balance (7-variable VAR)
Shocks
Steps Appreciation Equity Housing
4 quarters 14.5 9.6 16.4
8 quarters 12.1 10.7 14.4
12 quarters 10.6 14.1 13.5
16 quarters 9.8 16.2 12.7
20 quarters 9.2 17.3 12.4
In summary, the ndings in this section indicate that asset price changes have been an important
driver of developments in the US trade balance over the past 30 years. However, as one would
expect, real exchange rate movements have also contributed to the variation in trade balance,
exerting a slightly more moderate e¤ect.
5 Robustness and Extensions
Empirical results are often dependent on underlying assumptions and variables denitions. A key
advantage of the Bayesian VAR with sign restrictions is that it requires only a small number
of identication restrictions, which are relatively uncontroversial. While we have described the
identifying assumptions in detail above, we now turn to discussing various alternative variables
denitions and also di¤erent VAR specications.
5.1 Allowing for additional shocks
An important issue refers to the robustness of our ndings to the inclusion of further variables in
the VAR and the allowance for additional shocks. First, there is some evidence that productivity
shocks have been an important determinant of current account positions (Bussiere et al., 2005;
Corsetti et al., 2006). Also, productivity increases may be important drivers of US asset prices.
However, as pointed out by Kraay and Ventura (2005), the large asset price boom in the US in
the 1990s and the decline in the early 2000s may hardly be attributed to productivity. Second,
an important source of uctuations in exchange rates and, thereby, the current account stems from
monetary shocks, which have been the subject of a large empirical literature (e.g. Bems et al.,
2007). Third, scal policy shocks may also be an important driver of current account uctuations
(e.g. Corsetti and Müller, 2008).
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We check the sensitivity of our core results to the inclusion of all these three shocks: productivity,
monetary and scal. With respect to productivity shocks, we add relative GDP to the 7-variable
VAR described in the previous section.18 The short-run sign restrictions imposed for S = 2 quarters
to identify a positive productivity shock are that relative output and relative consumption increase,
and that the price di¤erential and relative interest rate decrease. The rst two restrictions should be
obvious. The third restriction is motivated by the mainstream model of price dynamics developed
in the 1970s (Gordon, 1977) and also present in Staiger et al. (1997). The idea is to treat a
productivity shock as a supply-side shock, so that increases in productivity should lower ination.
Dedola and Neri (2005) provide a thorough analysis of identifying productivity and technology
shocks in a structural VAR. The main point to note is that the identication of productivity shocks
separates them from equity shocks, as a positive equity shock is identied as raising interest rates
and consumption.
With respect to monetary policy shocks, our aim for extending the analysis to this shock is
not only to ensure the robustness of the e¤ects of asset prices as a driver of the US trade balance,
but also because it has been mentioned in the debate on global imbalances as a relevant factor
(e.g. Bems et al., 2007). To allow for this channel in the VAR framework, we introduce monetary
policy shocks. The sign restrictions imposed are the same as those in the literature discussed above,
such that a monetary tightening shock increases short-term interest rates, lowers prices, decreases
relative output, and raises the US real e¤ective exchange rate.
Finally, we identify scal policy shocks following Peersman and Straub (2009). Specically,
we impose the restrictions that a positive scal policy shock increases relative output, reduces
private consumption expenditure, increases relative prices and relative interest rates. Note that
Peersman and Straub (2009) do not impose a sign restriction on consumption but they document
that empirically a positive scal policy shock reduces consumption expenditure, which is one of our
sign restrictions to identify the scal policy shock.
18The data are from the IFS, and the relative real GDP measure is calculated as the di¤erence between the log of
US real GDP and the log of the sum of real GDP for G7 ex US.
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Table 3. Variance decomposition for the US trade balance
Shocks
Steps Appreciation Equity Housing Productivity Mon. Pol. Fiscal
4 quarters 12.8 10.6 17.5 7.2 8.5 13.2
8 quarters 11.5 10.9 17.1 8.1 9.0 12.4
12 quarters 8.9 12.1 16.8 9.3 10.4 11.3
16 quarters 8.5 13.7 16.5 12.8 10.9 10.2
20 quarters 7.9 16.1 15.0 14.2 11.2 9.7
Table 3 shows the variance decomposition for our extended, 8-variable VAR specication in-
cluding also productivity, monetary and scal policy shocks. Two key results stand out. First,
the role of asset prices as a driver of the US trade balance is conrmed. In fact, the share of the
US trade balance explained by equity and housing shocks amount to about 31% after 20 quarters,
which is very similar to our baseline result obtained in the previous section. Second, we also nd
support for the ndings of the previous literature in that productivity, monetary and scal policy
shocks have been exerting substantial e¤ects, explaining up to 14%, 11% and 10%, respectively, of
the US trade balance after 20 quarters. Thus, overall, asset prices are conrmed as a key driver
of the US trade balance while exchange rate shocks appear to have been somewhat less important,
with about 8% of the variance of the trade balance being driven by them after 20 quarters.
5.2 Alternative denitions and identication
We estimate the Bayesian VAR using an alternative denition of several variables in our benchmark
model. First, we replace the trade balance by the current account. In recent years, the di¤erence
between these two variables has been relatively small as the US income account was close to
balance. However, the di¤erence was much more sizeable in previous years, primarily due to the
large positive net income stemming from higher returns on US assets compared to US liabilities.
The problem with including income into our trade measure is that it captures very di¤erent elements
(e.g. changes in returns) from trade in goods and services; thus, our preferred measure remains the
trade balance.
Figure 4 gives the impulse response of the US current account to the three types of shocks of
interest. Overall, the baseline ndings from the augmented VAR prove robust to using the current
account instead of the trade balance. The only meaningful di¤erence is that the magnitude of the
current account response is slightly larger for all three shocks, conrming the e¤ect of the exchange
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rate on income via returns and valuation changes (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007).
Second, we investigate the sensitivity of the results by using nominal (as opposed to real)
e¤ective exchange rate shocks. As shown for the benchmark VAR above, relative prices react to
real exchange rate shocks, which leaves open the question of how much of the real exchange rate
shocks reect nominal exchange rate changes and how much reects relative price adjustments.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the US trade balance to nominal e¤ective exchange rate
shocks for the three benchmark VAR models estimated in Section 4. Again the results are not
sensitive to using nominal exchange rates, with the elasticities being only marginally di¤erent.
5.3 Alternative Impulse Response Calculation
As noted by Fry and Pagan (2007), there are conceptual problems related to the selection of the
median impulse response, resulting from the multiplicity of impulse vectors. In particular, they
show that median impulse response functions may be generated by di¤erent impulse matrices Q.
Thus, the median of the impulse responses may not be generated by a single model and, as a
consequence, the shocks identied are no longer orthogonal to each other. Fry and Pagan (2007)
propose to calculate the response that is as close as possible to the median response while being
generated from one single matrix Q.19
We check the sensitivity of our results by applying the method suggested by Fry and Pagan
(2007) to the 7-variable VAR in equation (5). The results are displayed by the dotted line in Figure
6, and the variance decomposition results are shown in Table 4. We nd that our core results are
not qualitatively changed when applying this method.
Table 4. Variance decomposition using the Fry-Pagan method
Shocks
Steps Appreciation Equity Housing
4 quarters 13.0 10.4 17.2
8 quarters 11.3 11.3 18.3
12 quarters 12.2 15.2 16.8
16 quarters 11.0 17.3 14.3
20 quarters 10.5 18.7 13.8
19This approach has been applied by Enders, Müller and Scholl (2008). Note, however, that Enders et al. (2008)
do not nd a signicant di¤erence in results between their baseline specication based on the median response and
the Fry-Pagan method, suggesting that the problems discussed here do not always a¤ect empirical work.
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6 Conclusions
The debate on the causes of global current account imbalances is still wide open. This paper has
focused on one specic question: How important are asset prices and exchange rates as drivers of
the US trade balance? There has been important theoretical work stressing the relevance both of
the asset price channel through wealth e¤ects and of relative price changes implicit in exchange
rate movements, but little systematic empirical work has been carried out to quantify the role of
asset price shocks.
To address this question, the paper has employed a Bayesian VAR model, which requires impos-
ing only a minimum of sign restrictions that have a meaningful economic interpretation. Our main
nding is that asset prices are an important driver of the US trade balance. In fact, 30% of the
movements of the US trade balance after 20 quarters can be accounted for by asset price shocks,
and only about 9% by shocks to the US dollar real exchange rate. These results are robust to
various extensions and alternative specications. For instance, while also US productivity shocks,
monetary and scal policy shocks are found to exert a signicant e¤ect on the US current account,
asset prices remain a key driver of the US current account in all VARs estimated.
From a policy perspective, a question that arises is what the ndings of the paper imply for
the future adjustment process of global imbalances. Our analysis has been backward-looking and
there is obviously no certainty that economic relationships of the past will hold in the future. The
results of the paper suggest, however, that while a large US dollar depreciation could and may well
be a key driver of the adjustment process, it doesnt necessarily have to be. Instead, a sizable part
of the adjustment could stem from an unwinding of relative asset price developments, either via a
fall in US asset prices or a rise in asset prices outside the US.
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to Exchange Rate Shock (5-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figure shows the Impulse Responses to an appreciation shock. The responses of the real effective exchange rate and 
relative consumption were restricted not to be negative and the responses of relative prices and the relative interest rate were 
restricted not to be positive for two quarters. The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution and the dashed lines 
represent the 16% and 84% quantiles.  
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Figure 3.A. Impulse Responses to Exchange Rate Shock (7-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figure shows the Impulse Responses to an appreciation shock. The responses of the real effective exchange rate and 
relative consumption were restricted not to be negative and the responses of relative prices and the relative interest rate were 
restricted not to be positive for two quarters. The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution and the dashed lines 
represent the 16% and 84% quantiles.  
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Figure 3.B. Impulse Responses to Equity Shock (7-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figure shows the Impulse Responses to an equity shock. The responses of relative equity, relative consumption and 
the relative interest rate were restricted not to be negative for two quarters. The solid line is the median of the posterior 
distribution and the dashed lines represent the 16% and 84% quantiles. 
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Figure 3.C. Impulse Responses to Housing Shock (7-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figure shows the Impulse Responses to a housing shock. The responses of relative housing, relative consumption, 
relative prices and the relative interest rate were restricted not to be negative for two quarters. The solid line is the median of the 
posterior distribution and the dashed lines represent the 16% and 84% quantiles. 
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Figure 4. Impulse Responses to the Current Account to Exchange Rate, Equity and Housing 
Shocks (7-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figures show the Impulse Responses of the Current Account to an appreciation shock, an equity shock and a housing 
shock in a 7-variable VAR. The sign restrictions are the same as the ones in figures 4.A, 4.B and 4.C. The solid line is the median 
of the posterior distribution and the dashed lines represent the 16% and 84% quantiles. 
 
 
Figure 5. Impulse Responses to Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Shock 
(5-, 6- and 7-variable VAR) 
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Notes: The figures show the Impulse Responses of the Trade Balance to an appreciation shock when the model is specified using 
the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate instead of the Real Effective Exchange Rate in a 5, 6 and 7 variables VAR. The sign 
restrictions are the same as in figures 2, 3.A and 4.A. The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution and the dashed 
lines represent the 16% and 84% quantiles. 
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Figure 6. Comparison Median and Median Solution 
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Notes: The figures show the Impulse Responses of the Trade Balance to an appreciation shock, an equity shock and a housing 
shock in a 7-variable VAR. The sign restrictions are the same as in figures 4.A., 4.B and 4.C. The solid line is the median of the 
posterior distribution and the dashed lines represent the 16% and 84% quantiles. The dotted line represents the impulse responses 
generated by the median solution proposed by Fry and Pagan (2007). 
 
 
